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JUSTICE HARLAN AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A MODEL FOR HOW A CLASSIC CONSERVATIVE COURT
WOULD ENFORCE THE BILL OF RIGHTS*
NADINE STROSSEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
A study of Justice Harlan's enforcement of the Bill of Rights is
particularly timely at the present juncture in the Supreme Court's history.
We now have a Court that is regularly described as "conservative,"
including in its attitude toward the Bill of Rights.' By analyzing the Bill
of Rights jurisprudence of Justice Harlan, a highly respected judicial
conservative,' and comparing it to the corresponding jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court, one can appreciate how far the Rehnquist Court deviates
from classic conservative principles concerning the judicial role in
enforcing individual liberties. However else one would describe the
Rehnquist Court's ideology regarding the Bill of Rights, it should not
parade under the misnomer of judicial conservatism.3
In exploring Justice Harlan's support for the Bill of Rights, and
contrasting it to the Rehnquist Court's skepticism toward those rights, this
article is divided into two major sections. The first describes four
important lines of Bill of Rights cases in which Justice Harlan was
particularly protective of individual liberties, even as compared with other
* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991).
** Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties
Union. For research assistance with this article, the author thanks Marie Costello, Bill
Mills, Ramyar Moghadassi, and Catherine Siemann.
Consistent with Judge Abner Mikva's example and advice, the notes accompanying
this article are citations to authority and contain nothing of substance. See Abner J. Mikva,
Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. CoLO. L. REv. 647 (1985).
1. See, e.g., Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis Powell Jr.: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1971) (statement
of Sen. Hart); William G. Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate
Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and
Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees, 62 TUL L. REv. 109, 121 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 24 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon,
Coming to Terms With Death: The Cruzan Case, 42 HAsTINGS L.J. 817, 847 (1991).
3. For a definition of "conservative" in this context, see David Chang, Discriminatory
Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative
Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 791 (1991).
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members of the libertarian Warren Court. Justice Harlan's decisions that
take an expansive view of certain individual liberties and a narrow view
of governmental power to limit them contrast sharply with the Rehnquist
Court's general hostility to individual rights and deference to government
authority.
The second section outlines Justice Harlan's overall judicial approach
to the Bill of Rights. That approach was dominated by his view that active
judicial enforcement of constitutional rights was not the most effective
strategy for securing individual liberty in the long run. Consequently, in
contrast to other members of the Warren Court, Justice Harlan often
declined to engage in activistic enforcement of the Bill of Rights. At first
glance, the opinions setting forth this philosophy of judicial restraint might
seem inconsistent with those outlined in the first section of this article.
Both are harmonized, though, by Justice Harlan's classically conservative
views: he believed that individual freedom is of supreme importance and
that the preservation of such freedom generally depends on limiting federal
judicial power.
I1. A CLASSIC CONSERVATIVE'S STAUNCH
DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
Justice Harlan's protective stance toward certain Bill of Rights
provisions distinguished him even among the members of the Warren
Court, and far more so from the current Rehnquist Court. This attitude
was most prominent in cases concerning the Fourth Amendment, the
Establishment Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the implied right of
privacy.
A. The Fourth Amendment
In cases involving searches and seizures by federal law enforcement
officers, Justice Harlan supported the stringent enforcement of the Fourth
Amendment's requirements, including its requirement that searches and
seizures be based on a warrant, except under exigent circumstances.'
Preliminarily, it must be stressed that Justice Harlan's interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment can be found only in cases concerning searches
and seizures by federal agents. Justice Harlan did not take a similarly
limited view of the government's search and seizure power in cases
involving state or local law enforcement officers.5 This double standard
4. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
5. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 105-06 (1967) (Harlan, I., dissenting);
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did not at all reflect a relatively weak conception of the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, it reflected Justice Harlan's general views concerning
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation controversy. He believed that
any guarantee in the Federal Constitution that was enforceable against
state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment was
applicable only in general terms.6 He rejected the Warren Court
majority's view that every detailed requirement associated with the Court's
interpretation of a federal constitutional guarantee also should be
enforceable against state and local governments. 7
Justice Harlan took pains to emphasize the importance of the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement for searches and seizures conducted by
federal officials, in this respect standing out even on the Warren Court,
which zealously policed the police. For example, in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire," Justice Harlan wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize
this point. He explained that he supported the majority ruling because "a
contrary result . . . would, I fear, go far toward relegating the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to a position of little consequence
in federal search and seizure law."' Similarly, in his opinion for the
Court in Giordenello v. United States,"° Justice Harlan upheld strict
standards for the issuance of arrest warrants to federal officers.
It is important to qualify the description of Justice Harlan's protective
attitude toward Fourth Amendment rights by noting that he bears some
responsibility for initiating a development in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that has diminished that Amendment's protective scope.
However, Justice Harlan himself repudiated that development shortly after
its initiation, thus reinforcing the conclusion that he was consistently
concerned with limiting the government's search and seizure power.
Specifically, in its 1967 watershed ruling in Katz v. United States,"
the Court held that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,"1 and declined to limit the Amendment's scope to certain
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 678-86 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171-72 (1968) (Harlan, I.,
dissenting); Ker, 374 U.S. at 44 (Harlan, J., concurring); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 360-61 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 680 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 172 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Douglas, 372 U.S. at
361 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 678-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
9. Id. at 492 (Harlan, J., concurring).
10. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. Id. at 351.
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.protected areas. In his seminal concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan
described searches and seizures, for Fourth Amendment purposes, as those
governmental intrusions that invade a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." 3 He elaborated upon this concept, describing it as "an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.'"' 4 Since then, Justice Harlan's formulation
has been adopted as the Court's accepted definition of Fourth Amendment
searches.'S
The Katz test expanded the then-accepted scope of the Fourth
Amendment. Reversing Olmstead v. United States, 6 which had held that
a wiretap does not constitute a search because it invades no physical
property, Katz held that attaching an electronic listening device to a phone
booth did constitute a search because it invaded a domain in which the
search victim reasonably expected privacy-a telephone conversation. 17
In subsequent cases, however, the Katz definition of a search has been
used to the opposite effect-to limit, rather than expand, the reach of
Fourth Amendment protections. 8 In recent years, as our society has
become inured to increasingly pervasive forms of mass surveillance, the
definition of protected privacy in terms of societal expectations has led to
a downward spiral; the more our society tolerates various forms of
searches and seizures, the narrower the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" will become, with the result that additional types of governmental
invasions will be deemed beyond the pale of Fourth Amendment
protection.
To his credit, only four years after enunciating his Katz standard for
the Fourth Amendment's scope, Justice Harlan presciently anticipated the
negative impact that the standard could have on Fourth Amendment rights.
Dissenting from the majority's decision upholding a search and seizure in
United States v. White, 9 Justice Harlan criticized the Katz test. He
explained: "The analysis must . . . transcend the search for subjective
expectations . . . .Our expectations ...are in large part reflections of
the laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and
present. "20
13. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 361.
15. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
19. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
20. Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Harlan's strict enforcement of Fourth Amendment standards
occasionally stimulated the ire of other members of the Warren Court,
including the liberal Justice Black. For example, dissenting from one
decision that had been authored by Justice Harlan, which vigorously
enforced the Fourth Amendment for a criminal defendant's benefit, Justice
Black said: "[T]he importance of bringing guilty criminals to book is a far
more crucial consideration than the desirability of giving defendants every
possible assistance."2"
Justice Harlan's strong enforcement of the Fourth Amendment
distinguishes him even more vividly from the current Court. As one
important example, Justice Harlan is set apart from the Rehnquist Court
by his insistence that the Fourth Amendment requires adherence to the
warrant requirement set out in the Amendment's second clause (the
"Warrant Clause"), in addition to the general "reasonableness" standard
set out in the Amendment's first clause.'
Probably no legacy of the Warren and Burger Courts has been more
quickly or thoroughly dismantled under Chief Justice Rehnquist's
leadership than the earlier Courts' Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'
The current Court construes the Fourth Amendment as if it did not even
contain the Warrant Clause, stating that the only constitutional requirement
is that searches and seizures meet the malleable, deferential "standard" of
reasonableness.' In contrast, the Warren Court treated the warrant
requirement as an independent prerequisite for a lawful search and seizure,
an essential element of "reasonableness."'
21. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 397 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
22. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. See Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock
to Meaningful Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1991)
[hereinafter Strossen, Roadblock]; Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance:
Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1175 (1988); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment,
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).
24. See, for example, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613
(1989), where the majority's rewriting of the Fourth Amendment was manifested in its
purported "quotation" of the amendment. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent,
"[t]he majority's recitation of the [Fourth] Amendment, remarkably" omitted the Warrant
Clause altogether. Id. at 637 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court for the Eastern Dist. of
1991]
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Whereas the Warren and Burger Courts recognized a few "jealously
and carefully drawn"' exceptions to the warrant requirement, under
Chief Justice Rehnquist's leadership, the Court-approved exceptions to that
requirement (as well as to the Warrant Clause's other requirement,
probable cause) have in large part swallowed the rule. The Rehnquist
Court has allowed warrantless searches in myriad circumstances,27 and
also has upheld searches conducted under invalid warrants, pursuant to the
"good faith" exception.'
Those who argue that the Rehnquist Court has adhered to conservative
values in the law enforcement area would be hard-pressed to explain the
stark contrast between that Court's wholesale licensing of government
officers to intrude into individual privacy and freedom without prior
authorization, based on no particularized suspicion, and the views of the
esteemed conservative Justice Harlan. He refused to sanction government
interference with private lives or property through its search and seizure
power unless such interference had been authorized by an independent
magistrate, based on a specific, substantiated justification.
B. The Establishment Clause
Justice Harlan also took an especially protective view of rights
protected in the Bill of Rights in a series of cases that, in his view, raised
Establishment Clause problems. Justice Harlan espoused an unusually
strict interpretation of the Establishment Clause, even in the context of the
Warren Court, which rigorously enforced that clause."
Justice Harlan's especially stringent construction of the Establishment
Clause appeared in cases that centrally focused on free exercise values.
Whereas the majority essentially exalted free exercise concerns over
countervailing establishment concerns, Justice Harlan struck a different
balance. Specifically, the majority maintained that when a general
government measure would impose a substantial burden on the religious
beliefs of certain individuals, the government must make exceptions to that
general measure in order to accommodate the religious beliefs; such
Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 314-16 (1972).
26. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
27. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110
S. Ct. 2793 (1990); Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
28. See, e.g., Illinois v. Kuell, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.
79 (1987).




accommodation would be excused only if the government could show that
it would undermine a compelling state interest.
For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, ° the majority applied these
principles to a state's general rule that, to be eligible for unemployment
compensation, an individual must be available for Saturday work. The
Court ruled that the state had to make an exception to this general
eligibility requirement for a Seventh-Day Adventist, whose religious
beliefs forbade Saturday work.3' Dissenting, Justice Harlan wrote that
these governmentally compelled accommodations of religion-and only of
religion-fell afoul of the Establishment Clause, because they required
government to treat religiously grounded beliefs with a special solicitude
not afforded to any other type of belief.32
It must be stressed that Justice Harlan was not unsympathetic to the
free exercise claims of religious dissenters. He believed, though, that there
were other constitutionally permissible means for accommodating those
claims. First, the state could voluntarily create religiously based
exceptions.33 Second, the state could create neutral exceptions that would
exempt all whose conscientious beliefs-whether religious or secular-
would be burdened by the general measure at issue.'
Because Justice Harlan dissented from Warren Court decisions that
strictly scrutinized government measures limiting the free exercise of
religion, he might well have agreed with the result-although not with the
reasoning-of the Rehnquist Court's recent decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.35 In Smith, the Court rejected the free exercise claims
of individuals who had smoked peyote in religious ceremonies of the
Native American Church, and who argued that there should be a
religiously based exemption from the state's general prohibition against
peyote use. Justice Harlan may well have concluded that, regardless of
how meritorious these individuals' free exercise claims were, the state
could not be required to make an exception to its criminal drug laws for
religious reasons alone, because that would violate the Establishment
Clause.
In contrast, the Smith Court's holding that the state did not have to
exempt the religiously motivated use of peyote was not based on its
heightened sensitivity to Establishment Clause concerns. Rather, the Smith
30. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. See id. at 410.
32. See id. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 356-61 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356, 359 n.9, 361 n.12 (Harlan, I., concurring).
35. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Court's holding was grounded on its diminished sensitivity to Free
Exercise Clause concerns.' In Smith, the Rehnquist Court did not reach
the issue of whether any religious exemption that was mandated by the
Free Exercise Clause would have violated the Establishment Clause,
because it concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not mandate any
religious exemptions.' Had the Rehnquist Court considered an argument
that the requested exemption violated the Establishment Clause, it almost
certainly would have rejected that argument, given its narrow view of this
Clause. 8
Justice Harlan's invigorated view of the Establishment Clause, like his
strict enforcement of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, markedly
sets him apart from Chief Justice Rehnquist and his ideological allies.
Again, the striking contrast between the Establishment Clause
interpretation espoused by Justice Harlan, a respected conservative, and
that espoused by Chief Justice Rehnquist belie the description of the latter
as a conservative. Whereas Justice Harlan thought that even the Warren
Court did not give sufficient scope to the Establishment Clause in the
context of the free exercise accommodation cases discussed above, Chief
Justice Rehnquist consistently has argued-with growing support among
his Supreme Court colleagues-that the Warren and Burger Courts
interpreted the Establishment Clause too broadly.
Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly has questioned the
Lemon test for assessing whether government measures comport with
the Establishment Clause.' This test, which was enunciated in a 1971
opinion by then-Chief Justice Warren Burger, drew upon decisions from
the Warren Court, and stated that a government measure would constitute
an unconstitutional establishment of religion if it failed any one of the
following three criteria: (1) if it did not have a secular purpose, (2) if its
primary effect was to advance or inhibit religion, or (3) if it caused an
excessive entanglement between government and religion.41
Under Chief Justice Rehnquist's much narrower view of the
Establishment Clause, a government measure might violate all three
prongs of the Lemon test and still be constitutional. He believes that the
Establishment Clause enjoins only two limited types of government
36. See Strossen, Roadblock, supra note 23, at 382-88.
37. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
38. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990); Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1990); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1989).
39. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
40. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616.
41. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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measures regarding religion: (1) the government's literal establishment of
a particular religion-i.e., the creation of a state church, parallel to the
Church of England in Great Britain, and (2) government discrimination
among religions.42 Chief Justice Rehnquist's constricted view is
supported by several other members of the current Court.43 These
Justices clearly would view a governmental measure designed to
accommodate religious beliefs as compatible with their circumscribed view
of the Establishment Clause. Indeed, they expressly have upheld
government measures that took account of religious beliefs, and have
rejected Establishment Clause challenges to such measures, explaining that
the government should accommodate its citizens' religious beliefs.'
Thus, the Rehnquist Court has inverted the previous Courts'
interpretations of when governmental accommodation of religion is
appropriate. The Warren and Burger Courts ruled that government must
take minority religious beliefs into account in protecting those who hold
such beliefs from generally applicable laws, passed by majoritarian
governmental institutions, which have an adverse impact on their beliefs.
Conversely, these Courts ruled that government must not take majoritarian
religious beliefs into account as rationales for enacting general measures.
In the reverse of that pattern, the Rehnquist Court has ruled that
government has no obligation to take minority religious beliefs into
account by shielding them from generally applicable laws that burden their
religious beliefs. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist and other members
of his Court have said that government may adopt measures that enshrine
majoritarian religious beliefs.
C. The Free Speech Clause
The third line of cases in which Justice Harlan enunciated an even
stronger-interpretation of Bill of Rights freedoms than did other members
of the Warren and Burger Court majorities involves free speech. Justice
Harlan's eloquent opinion in Cohen v. Califomia' stands as perhaps the
Court's most ringing endorsement of broadly interpreting the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Certainly, the earlier opinions by
Justices Holmes and Brandeis powerfully championed an expansive
protection of "political speech," which could contribute to the public
42. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ., dissenting); Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 84, 90, 91 (Burger, C.J., White, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., Board of Edue. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990); Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 573.
45. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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"marketplace of ideas."' Justice Harlan built upon those opinions,
though, to champion even speech that might not contribute to any public
discussion. He repudiated any attempt to circumscribe the Free Speech
Clause in terms of instrumental concerns about societal interests. Instead,
Justice Harlan celebrated the Clause as a libertarian vehicle for individual
self-expression of emotions, as well as ideas, valuable in and of itself. 7
Consistent with his conservative belief in limiting governmental power
over important spheres of individuality and autonomy, Justice Harlan
stated in Cohen:
The constitutional right of free expression is .... [i]ntended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.s
In accordance with this expansive view of free speech, Justice Harlan
strictly narrowed the countervailing societal concerns that might justify
governmental constraints upon individual self-expression. In Cohen, he
specifically said that the offensiveness of certain expression to a majority
in the community would not justify restraining the expression.49 State
governments may not, he said, "act[] as guardians of public morality."'
Again, therefore, Justice Harlan's conservative views contrast with the
views of the Rehnquist Court, which has shown substantial deference to
'majoritarian sensibilities as a basis for limiting expression. Most recently,
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Court upheld an absolute
prohibition upon a certain form of expression which it deemed to be
within the ambit of the Free Speech Clause--nude dancing-on the ground
that this type of expression offended the moral sensibilities of the majority
in the community. Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion sustained the
prohibition because it "furthers a substantial government interest in
protecting order and morality."52 In contrast, Justice Harlan stated in
46. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
47. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26.
48. Id. at 24.
49. See id. at 22-23.
50. Id. at 22.
51. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
52. Id. at 2462.
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Cohen that "it is largely because governmental officials cannot make
principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of
taste and style so largely to the individual." 53  Although the Rehnquist
Court has not expressly overturned the landmark. Cohen decision, it has
sharply limited that decision's reach, and implemented instead a radically
shrunken vision of our "system of freedom of expression."'
D. The Implied Right of Privacy
One of Justice Harlan's most celebrated opinions, his dissent in Poe
v. Ullman,5' is a landmark in the Court's recognition of the implied
constitutional right of privacy. Although the majority did not reach the
merits of the claim in that case56 -a challenge to Connecticut's law
banning the sale of contraceptives (even to married couples)--Justice
Harlan's dissent explained not only why the majority should have reached
the merits, but also why the law should be found unconstitutional. 7
His widely cited58 dissenting opinion was the first Supreme Court
endorsement of an implied right of privacy in the context of reproductive
decisions. It laid the groundwork for the majority's decision invalidating
the very same statute in Griswold v. Connecticut9 four years later.
Justice Harlan incorporated that influential dissent into his concurrence in
Griswold.' His powerful reasoning, which recognized unenumerated
rights under a natural law approach, has been cited in subsequent Supreme
Court landmarks developing this important realm of individual rights.6"
53. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
54. This phrase was coined by Yale Law School Professor Thomas Emerson. See
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 34 (1970).
55. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 508-09.
57. See id. at 522-55.
58. Justice Harlan's approach to the right of privacy has been employed or expanded
upon by the Court in a number of important subsequent privacy cases. See, e.g., Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1972). In contrast, Justice Douglas's
rationale in Griswold, that the right of privacy is found within the penumbra of the Bill of
Rights, was never subsequently adopted by the Court. Outside of two dissenting opinions
by Douglas himself-Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 778 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)-no Supreme Court opinion has expressed the view that a right of privacy
derives from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
59. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60. See id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2943 (1990); Akron v. Akron
1991]
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Once again, the conservative Justice Harlan's leadership in the judicial
articulation of an implied privacy right contrasts sharply with the
Rehnquist Court's leadership in the judicial retrenchment from this right.
In its most recent pronouncements on the subject, the Rehnquist Court has
been reluctant both to recognize any such rights,62 and to accord them
any meaningful judicial protection even if they are recognized. '
This particular contrast illustrates a more general disparity between
the classic conservatism of Justice Harlan and the neo-conservatism of
Chief Justice Rehnquist: Justice Harlan was willing to give broad scope to
the Constitution's protection of individual liberties, extrapolating from
express textual protections to infer additional protections from the broad
purposes underlying the specific language. It is noteworthy, for example,
that Justice Harlan was the first Justice to articulate not only the implied
constitutional right of privacy governing matters of sexuality and
reproduction, but also the implied constitutional freedom of association. '
In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist and other Justices who now dominate
the Court's majority have evinced a deep hostility to recognizing any
implied constitutional rights. Justice Harlan perceived the Constitution as
creating islands of government authority amidst a sea of individual
freedom, whereas Chief Justice Rehnquist and his brethren view the
Constitution as creating islands of individual freedom amidst a sea of
government authority.'
III. JUSTICE HARLAN'S PHILOSOPHY THAT ACTIVE
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS IS NOT
THE MOST EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR SECURING LIBERTY
I will now turn from Justice Harlan's decisions concerning particular
Bill of Rights provisions to broad themes which unify his Bill of Rights
jurisprudence more generally. Probably the most general overall theme,
which links the entire corpus of Justice Harlan's opinions in this field, is
that he did not, in general, champion vigorous judicial enforcement of the
Bill of Rights.
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
320 (1982); Moore, 431 U.S. at 499, 502; see also supra note 58.
62. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989).
63. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851-
52 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507-11 (1989).
64. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
65. This metaphor was previously used by Professor Stephen Macedo. See STEPHEN
MACEDO, THE NEW RiGHT v. THE CONSnTUtiON 32 (1987); see also Calvin R. Massey,
The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for State Constitutional Law,
1990 Wis. L. REV. 1229, 1260.
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As the first section of this article demonstrated, there were important
exceptions to the foregoing generalization. With respect to significant
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, Justice Harlan urged-and
practiced-vigorous judicial enforcement. These opinions emphasize that
Justice Harlan's general reluctance to expand federal judicial power for
purposes of enforcing the Bill of Rights stemmed not from any disregard
for individual rights, but rather, from a distrust of expanded federal
governmental power-including federal judicial power. Justice Harlan's
suspicion of increased federal power derived precisely from his concern
that, in the long run, it could well undermine individual freedom.
In light of the inroads that the activistic Rehnquist Court has made
into individual liberty, as illustrated in the preceding section, Justice
Harlan's views in this regard have proven sadly prophetic. They remind
us of the value of taking the long-range perspective that characterized his
Bill of Rights writings, looking beyond the immediate results in a
particular case to its broader implications for liberty generally and in the
long run.
Justice Harlan's judicial approach to the Bill of Rights entails three
interrelated subthemes, each of which will be discussed in turn: that
judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights is not the only effective strategy
for advancing individual freedom, that liberty could be better protected
through strategies other than vigorous judicial review, and that a uniform
national standard for individual rights, prescribed by the Supreme Court,
could undermine such rights.'
Justice Harlan's belief that a judicially enforced Bill of Rights was not
the only effective strategy for securing individual liberty was forcefully
stated, for example, in a speech he delivered in 1963. He said:
It is, I think, frequently overlooked that the Bill of Rights,
even in the guardianship of the Supreme Court, is not the sole
bulwark against the diminution or loss of things that are
associated with what is called the American way of life. Three
other factors are, I think, of equal, though perhaps less obvious,
importance.
The first is the peculiar genius of our federal system under
which we have achieved national solidarity and unparalleled
strength and at the same time kept governmental authority
workably diffused between the federal establishment and the
states ...
The second is the principle of diffusion of power within the
federal government itself ....
66. For an extended exploration of some of these themes, see J. Harvie Wilkinson m11,
Justice John M. Harlan andthe Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REV. 1185 (1971).
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The third factor is enlightened public opinion.67
I believe that Justice Harlan's emphasis on the importance of public
opinion as a guarantor of liberty is worth noting. He elaborated on this
point as follows:
With respect to decisions of the Supreme Court, the final
expositor of the Constitution under our system, this factor is no
less essential than in other aspects of the democratic process...
. Given adequate enlightenment ... it disrespects the character
of our people to suppose that they will not [understand the
Constitution] .... [The American people] are a... fair-minded
people whose ultimate support can be counted on for any
constitutional decision which, with due regard for the claims of
history, is grounded on principles that are manifestly fair and
right. To doubt these things is to foresee a future that has no
anchors to the past.'
Justice Harlan also urged lawyers to engage in the important process of
public education about freedom:
Public enlightenment in this field is a function not merely of a
free and responsible press, but also, and to an important extent,
of the bar, to whom the public is entitled to look both for
guidance in the understanding of constitutional decisions and
leadership in respect for law.'
Justice Harlan's emphasis on public education as a pillar on which to
support individual liberty leads to the second subtheme in his philosophical
approach to the Bill of Rights: his opinion that individual rights could be
more effectively protected through strategies other than invigorated judicial
review.
Justice Harlan resisted the reliance on courts as instruments of social
change because he believed that better and more durable social reforms
could be effected through the political process. Because of popular
participation in the political process, he believed that rights which were
protected through that process would have greater public acceptance than
rights that the public viewed as created by and imposed on them by an
unelected judiciary. Accordingly, he reasoned, judicially recognized rights
were less stable and secure than rights protected through the elected
67. John M. Harlan, Dedicatory Address, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 920, 922 (1963).
68. Id. at 922-23.
69. Id. at 922.
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branches of government. Justice Harlan expressed this viewpoint, for
example, in his dissent from the Warren Court's famous decision in
Miranda v. Arizona:'
It is no secret that concern has been expressed lest long-range and
lasting reforms be frustrated by this Court's too rapid departure
from existing constitutional standards. . .. [The practical effect
of the decision . . . must inevitably be to handicap seriously
sound efforts at reform, not least by removing options necessary
to a just compromise of competing interests. Of course legislative
reform is rarely speedy . . . though this Court has been more
patient in the past."
Justice Harlan is wrong in suggesting that decisions such as Miranda,
which resolve important and controversial public policy issues, inevitably
would chill public debate on those issues. To the contrary, such decisions
can as easily stimulate public dialogue about, and legislative responses to,
the underlying issues. For example, the Court's decisions in Brown v.
Board of Education' and its progeny are widely credited with inspiring
the civil rights movement, and with laying the groundwork for Congress's
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.'3
Just as the Court's civil rights decisions sparked significant supportive
public response and legislative action, other Supreme Court decisions have
sparked significant negative public response and legislative attempts to
counteract them. The very decision that provoked Justice Harlan's above-
cited dissent-Miranda-is one important example in that category.74
The Court's decision in Roe v. Wade;' is another significant example. 76
70. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71. Id. at 524 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis
of Professor Carter's Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U. L. REV. 47, 54 n.32 (1986);
Lisa J. Laplace, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas: Fair Housing or Forced
Housing?, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 197, 223 (1989).
74. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice As a Guide toAmerican
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We
Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 581-85 (1990); Bettie E. Goldman, Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly
Stepping Backwards to Pre-Miranda Days?, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 245 (1985); David
Lavey, United States v. Porter: A New Solution to the Old Problem of Miranda and
Ambiguous Requests for Counsel, 20 GA. L. REV. 221, 233-34 (1985); Henry P.
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 762-63
(1988).
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 759
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Far from lulling citizens and government officials into passive acceptance
of the Court's resolutions of the underlying issues, both of these decisions
apparently mobilized citizens and elected officials to push for measures
that would limit and even overturn the Court's rulings. Moreover, such
efforts have been highly successful. One measure of their success is the
popular election of Presidents who emphasized, and followed through on,
campaign pledges to appoint Supreme Court Justices who would respect
"law and order" and the "right to life."77
For the foregoing reasons, Justice Harlan exaggerated the danger that
the public and government agencies would be foreclosed from addressing
pressing social issues that the Supreme Court held to be governed by the
U.S. Constitution. There is, nevertheless, some real danger that Supreme
Court activism might curb the activism of other government bodies. This
leads to the third subtheme in Justice Harlan's general approach to the Bill
of Rights: his belief that a single- national standard, imposed by the
Supreme Court, could ultimately erode individual rights.
Some commentators have described the issues presented by this
subtheme by contrasting an "old freedom" with a "new freedom." 78 The
"old freedom" consists of the dispersion of power throughout the branches
and levels of government through separation of powers and federalism.
The "new freedom," instead, consists of the exercise of federal judicial
power to interpret expansively the Bill of Rights and its binding effect
upon all units of government.
To Justice Harlan, individual liberty was ultimately better protected
by the old freedom. Accordingly, his opinions stressed "the great roles
that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in
establishing and preserving American freedoms. "" For example, in his
dissent from the Warren Court's decision that ordered reapportionment of
state legislatures, Reynolds v. Sims,8" Justice Harlan wrote: "The
Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the
(1986); James Bopp, Jr., et al., Does the United States Supreme Court Have a
Constitutional Duty to Expressly Reconsider and Overrule Roe v. Wade?, I SErON HALL
CONST. L.J. 55, 99-101 (1990).
77. See, e.g., Michael Oreskes, Bush and Dukakis, with Anger, Debate Leadership
and Issues from Abortion to Iran-Contra: The Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1988, at Al; Robert E. Semple, Jr., Warren E. Burger Named Chief Justice by NrIxon; Now
on Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1969, § 1, at 1; Warren Weaver, Jr., Study Finds
Nixon Leads in 30 States, Wallace in 8, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1968, § 1, at 1.
78. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 66, at 1210-12.
79. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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premise that in a diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest
promise that this Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens." 8'
Justice Harlan's conception of federalism as a fundamental bulwark
against invasion of individual rights is consistent with his view that
"federalism was, above all, a constitutional mandate, not merely a
desirable policy which his fellow Justices were free to follow [or ignore]
at their discretion."' He consistently expressed these views in his
separate judicial opinions. In one concurrence, for example, Justice Harlan
stated that "[iut is too often forgotten in these times that the American
federal system is itself constitutionally ordained."' Similarly, in a
dissent, Justice Harlan wrote that "[c]onstitutionally principled
adjudication, high in the process of which is due recognition of the just
demands of federalism, leaves ample room for the protection of individual
rights.
Because of Justice Harlan's respect for federalism, which he viewed
as constitutionally mandated, he openly espoused a double standard for
judicial review of state and federal measures. As discussed in Part II of
this article, for example, Justice Harlan believed that the Fourth
Amendment's limitations on searches and seizures-which, in his view,
were strict---did not apply wholesale to searches and seizures conducted
by state or local law enforcement officers.85
Consistent with his strong view of federalism, Justice Harlan followed
the same dualistic approach to individual rights in the obscenity area as
well. He repeatedly expressed his view that a state standard for banning
obscenity passed federal constitutional muster, even though the very same
standard might well violate the First Amendment if it were enacted at the
federal level.s'
Those who know that Justice Harlan is an admired exponent of
judicial conservativism would probably be surprised to learn that he
frequently sided with the Warren Court's judicial liberals and activists in
interpreting the Bill of Rights in a federal context. Yet the same Justice
Harlan who often interpreted the Bill of Rights broadly in a federal
context also strongly resisted the, application of this broad federal
81. Id. at 625 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82. Wilkinson, supra note 66, at 1212.
83. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
84. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 99 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 456 (1966) (Harlan, I., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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interpretation to state and local governments. The seeming inconsistency
between these two strands of Justice Harlan's Bill of Rights opinions is
explained by the fact that he was less concerned about what substantive
standards should apply in a particular situation than with the importance
of preventing a single federal standard from controlling nationwide. He
voiced this underlying concern, for example, in his dissent in Malloy v.
Hogan,"' which held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination also applies to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment:
If the power of the States to deal with local crime is unduly
restricted, the likely consequence is a shift of responsibility in this
area to the Federal Government, with its vastly greater resources.
Such a shift . . . may in the end serve to weaken the very
liberties which the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards by bringing
us closer to the monolithic society which our federalism
rejects.88
Justice Harlan's belief that a uniform national standard on individual
rights could work to the detriment of such rights was based on two
principal grounds. First, he thought that a single standard would decrease
the possibility that state governments would adopt more rights-protective
standards. Justice Harlan was willing to risk some marginal infringement
of liberty within a single state, because that would avert what he viewed
as a greater threat to liberty-the imposition of a single national, freedom-
limiting standard. 9 For example, in Roth v. United States,'° Justice
Harlan explained:
The fact that the people of one State cannot read some of the
works of D.H. Lawrence seems to me, if not wise or desirable,
at least acceptable. But that no person in the United States should
be allowed to do so seems to me to be intolerable, and violative
of both the letter and the spirit of the First Amendment.91
Justice Harlan's second major basis for believing that a uniform
national standard could have a negative impact on liberty was his fear that,
if the Court realized that the standard it formulated would bind state and
87. 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 28.
89. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 86.
90. 354 U.S. at 476.
91. Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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local officials as well as federal agents, the Court might be tempted to
dilute the constitutional standard in order to minimize its interference with
state and local governments. The net impact on freedom could well be
negative, should the Court's price for imposing every detailed
interpretation of the Bill of Rights upon the states be to "waterl down
protections against the Federal Government . so as not unduly to
restrict the powers of the States."'2
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, Justice Harlan often differed with the liberal.majority on
the Warren Court not about which rights should be protected, but rather,
about how they should be protected. Thus, the two sets of opinions that
are described in Parts II and III of this article-opinions in which Justice
Harlan strictly enforced particular Bill of Rights guarantees and those in
which he urged federal judicial restraint in deference to other mechanisms
for enforcing those guarantees-are not, as they might superficially
appear, inconsistent with each other. Rather, these two sets of cases
should be understood as counterpart sides of the same coin: Justice
Harlan's belief that the greatest long-range danger to liberty is posed by
expanded federal governmental power, including federal judicial power.
To Justice Harlan, the judicial activism that his Warren Court brethren
deployed to advance individual liberty could also endanger liberty. His
focus was not on the temporary impact of the. Court's decisions, because
he recognized that judicial activism that one day is wielded to promote
individual rights may be wielded the next day to retard such rights.
Indeed, the constitutional philosophy of the Rehnquist majority has
demonstrated the accuracy of Justice Harlan's foresight. In two significant
respects, the Rehnquist Court is implementing a sharply different
constitutional philosophy than that of the classic conservative, Justice
Harlan. First, the Rehnquist Court is practicing judicial activism, rather
than restraint, in terms of deciding which cases and issues to review.'
Furthermore, the Rehnquist majority exercises its aggressively asserted
judicial review power in order to sustain governmental authority, and
majoritarian preferences, at the cost of individual and minority group
rights. In contrast, Justice Harlan exemplified a philosophy of judicial
restraint, in order to limit government power-including the power of the
federal courts-and to protect individual freedom; when he departed from
92. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93. See Nadine Strossen, Introduction, 7 N.Y.L. SCR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 5-7 (Symp.
1990); see also Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, Limiting Access to the Federal Courts: Round Up
the Usual Victims, 6 WMITrER L. REv. 967 (1984).
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his general presumption that judicial power should be cautiously deployed,
it was also in service of the goal of protecting liberty.
At the time that this article is being written, the foregoing
development-and civil libertarians' attendant fear of active Supreme
Court Justices who interpret the Bill of Rights expansively-is crystallized
in the debate surrounding President Bush's nomination of Judge Clarence
Thomas to the Supreme Court. Many advocates of individual and minority
group rights cite Judge Thomas's beliefs in "natural law" and a judge's
obligation to interpret the Constitution in light of natural law principles,
as a basis for opposing-or at least questioning-his appointment.' They
correctly point out that judicial activism in service of unwritten higher lawprinciples could be invoked, for example, to protect the rights of a fetus,
to the detriment of women's rights.95
Justice Harlan's philosophy concerning judicial enforcement of the Bill
of Rights was consistent with his qualities that Professor Van Alstyne
extolled when he said that Justice Harlan represented an example of
"virtue as practice," insofar as he judged constitutional matters
truthfully.' Justice Harlan resisted the temptation to impose his views
about individual freedoms upon all branches and levels of government and
upon all citizens nationwide, in the belief that judicial restraint in the long
run would best serve those freedoms. In addition to practicing the virtue
of "patience" through his own style of adjudication, Justice Harlan urged
it upon others as well, also in an attempt to maintain limits on government
power and to preserve individual liberty. He repeatedly asked for
"patience on the part of those who might like to see things move faster
among States."'
94. See, e.g., Danny Goldberg, It's Religion in Sheep's Clothing, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
3, 1991, at B5; A.J. Congress to Oppose Thomas Unless He Declares Himself on Crucial
Issues, PR Newswire, Aug. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File
(prepared by American Jewish Congress); Statewide Coalition Formed to Oppose Thomas
Nomination to the Supreme Court: Coalition Calls on Senator Sanford to Defeat Nominee,
PR Newswire, Sept. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (prepared
by People for the American Way); Women Lawyers' Association Announces Opposition to
Confirmation of Judge Clarence Thomas, Business Wire, Sept. 12, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (prepared by Women Lawyers Ass'n).
95. See, e.g., David Lauter, Justices Often Use Natural Law Concepts; Constitution's
Vagueness May Require It, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A19; David Margolick, Sizing
Up the Talk of 'Natural Law: Many Ideologies Discover a Precept, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1991, at A22; Laurence H. Tribe, 'Natural Law' and the Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1991, at A15.
96. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Enduring Example of John Marshall Harlan:
"Virtue As Practice" in the Supreme Court, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 109, 116-18 (1991).
97. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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A commentator who has analyzed Justice Harlan's judicial philosophy
has well summarized the close interlinking between his virtues, as
described by Professor Van Alstyne, and his classic conservativism. J.
Harvie Wilkinson I[[ stated:
To withstand the temptation to seize the many opportunities that
a Justice has to impose his views on others requires a rare
combination of human virtues. These include humility and
tolerance, resistance to fad and contemporaneity, and contentment
with decisions often noted more for their craftsmanship than their
capacity for headlines."
Justice Harlan's belief in the type of individual virtue which Professor
Van Alstyne says he exemplified is demonstrated by the conclusion of an
address he gave in 1963. Justice Harlan ended that lecture with a passage
from Confucius, explaining that the passage "seems to me to fit well the
needs of a free society in these turbulent times when the importance of
individual excellence is too often lost sight of through preoccupation with
the grandiose."' The Confucius passage, which fittingly expresses
Justice Harlan's own "virtue in practice," reads:
The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout
the empire first ordered well their own States.
Wishing to order well their States, they first regulated their
families.
Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their
persons.
Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts.
Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in
their thoughts.
Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the
utmost their knowledge.
Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.
Things being investigated, knowledge became complete.
From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must
consider the cultivation of the person the root of every thing
besides.
98. Wilkinson, supra note 66, at 1189.
99. Harlan, supra note 67, at 923.
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It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that what should spring
from it will be well ordered."
100. Id. at 923-24 (quoting CONFUCIUS, The Great Learning, in THE BOOK OF
RITUAL, reprinted in 1 JAMES LEGGE, THE CHINESE CLASSICS 221-23 (1861)).
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